We develop a model to analyze how board oversight a¤ects …rms' …nancial reporting choices, and managers'incentives to manipulate accounting reports. Ceteris paribus, conservative accounting is advantageous because it enables boards to make more cautious project approval decisions. This feature of conservatism, however, causes managers to manipulate the system in an attempt to distort decision making. E¤ective reporting oversight curtails managers'ability to manipulate, reducing the negative side e¤ects of conservatism. Our model predicts that stronger reporting oversight leads to greater accounting conservatism, manipulation, and investment e¢ ciency.
Introduction
In the wake of recent accounting scandals around the world, commentators and regulators have called for stronger governance and board oversight to curb accounting manipulation and fraud. These calls have led to boards with more outside directors and greater …nancial expertise.
1 Recent empirical evidence suggests that stronger governance and board oversight is associated with more conservative accounting (e.g., Lobo and Zhou 2006; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012; García Lara et al. 2009 ). 2 We o¤er a model that provides a rationale for this observation and generates predictions that relate reporting oversight to the optimal choice of conservatism, the magnitude of accounting manipulation, reporting quality, and the e¢ ciency of investment decisions.
Our model is based on the idea that conservative accounting produces information that enables boards of directors to better oversee the …rm's investment strategies (e.g., Watts 2003a; García Lara et al. 2009; Ahmed and Duellman 2011) . Fama and Jensen (1983) hypothesize that rati…cation and monitoring are major roles played by boards of directors, and Bushman and Smith (2001) argue that …nancial reports can assist the board in these roles. In our model, the board uses conservative accounting to better screen out negative net present value (NPV) investments. However, the very fact that conservatism facilitates board interventions encourages the manager to manipulate the accounting system to mislead the board and distort its decisions.
Stronger oversight of …nancial reporting curtails the manager's ability to manipulate, and thereby reduces the negative side e¤ects associated with conservative accounting. Consequently, we predict that …rms with stronger reporting oversight choose more conservative accounting. Surprisingly, better oversight over reporting increases the level of manipulation in our setting. While monitoring has a direct e¤ect that mitigates manipulation, it also increases conservatism which, in turn, encourages manipulation.
We consider a model in which the board faces a strategic investment choice that can be viewed as expanding the …rm into a new market or product. The accounting system generates information that guides the board's decision whether to expand or maintain the status quo. Conservatism increases the veri…cation standards required for good relative to bad reports and, hence, increases the frequency of observing unfavorable accounting reports (e.g., Gigler et al. 2009 ). This feature of conservatism allows the board to better block bad investments (i.e., avoid Type I errors) but comes at the cost of blocking some good investments (i.e., induces Type II errors). Ceteris paribus, directors prefer conservative accounting because it supports their preference for conservative expansion decisions -that it, their strong desire to avoid Type I errors. The board can in ‡uence the conservatism of the company's accounting via the audit committee's oversight of …nancial reporting, accounting policies, and internal controls.
In contrast to the board, the manager prefers expansion whenever there is a chance of success and hence is more eager to avoid foregoing good projects (Type II error) and is less worried about implementing bad projects (Type I error). This preference can arise from private bene…ts of control that are proportional to the gross payo¤ from expansion (Stein 1997; Scharfstein and Stein 2000) , managerial optimism (e.g., Mal-mendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Graham et al. 2013) , or stock option holdings. 3 Because conservatism produces information that facilitates cautious investment strategies (i.e., avoid Type I errors at the cost of Type II errors), the manager has an incentive to manipulate the accounting system to distort the board's decision. As the level of conservatism increases, the probability of a false alarm (Type II error) increases and the manager has a stronger incentive to manipulate the system to increase the likelihood of expansion.
Coupling these two forces determines the optimal (interior) level of conservatism.
On the one hand, an increase in conservatism helps the board to block undesirable expansions, as long as the manager fails to manipulate the system. On the other hand, increased conservatism distorts investment decisions because it increases incentives for manipulation. As the board's reporting oversight becomes more e¤ective, the manager's ability to manipulate declines, and the latter (indirect) e¤ect becomes less important relative to the former (direct) e¤ect. As a result, …rms with stronger oversight …nd it optimal to use more conservative accounting systems. 4 In addition, our model provides insights into the e¤ects of reporting oversight on accounting manipulation and investment e¢ ciency. All else equal, stronger oversight leads to less manipulation, consistent with conventional views. However, the fact that reporting oversight directly curbs manipulation renders it optimal to choose more conservative accounting, which encourages manipulation. This indirect e¤ect on manipulation via conservatism dominates the direct e¤ect, such that improvements in reporting oversight lead to more accounting manipulation. Manipulation dampens, but does not reverse, the e¤ect of increased conservatism. As a result, better oversight improves the quality of reporting and the …rm's investment decisions. Our model therefore predicts that stronger reporting oversight is associated with greater accounting conservatism, manipulation, reporting quality, and investment e¢ ciency.
We also contribute to recent research on the impact of managerial optimism on accounting conservatism and manipulation. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) …nd evidence that …rms run by optimistic managers exhibit less conservative accounting, which they interpret as due to optimistic managers overvaluing net assets. Our model provides an alterative explanation for their evidence. A manager who is overly optimistic about the performance of expansion has a stronger incentive to distort the accounting system (consistent with Schrand and Zechman 2012) to increase the likelihood that the board approves expansion. While the board cannot control the manager's optimism, it can control the manipulation incentive that stems from conservative accounting. The board optimally reduces accounting conservatism to mitigate the optimistic manager's incentive to manipulate, yielding a negative relation between conservatism and manager optimism. In equilibrium, the indirect e¤ect via changes in the level of conservatism dominates, and greater managerial optimism leads to less manipulation, but also lower reporting quality and investment e¢ ciency.
In addition, the model predicts that …rms with less valuable growth opportunities rely on more conservative accounting systems. This result follows because when expansion opportunities are less attractive, the board is more eager to avoid bad investments and less concerned about forgoing good investments. Given that managers respond to an increase in conservatism with increased manipulation, the model sug-gests a higher level of manipulation in …rms with weaker growth opportunities. This is consistent with Givoly et al.'s (2007) …nding of a negative relation between marketto-book ratios and Basu's (1997) conservatism measure; however, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) provide evidence that measurement problems account for some of the observed negative relation.
Our model suggests that the magnitude of manipulation does not always proxy for reporting quality, in terms of the report's ability to facilitate investment decisions. On the one hand, as discussed earlier, stronger reporting oversight leads to greater investment e¢ ciency, but also leads to more conservative accounting, which induces more manipulation. Reporting oversight can therefore induce a positive relation between manipulation and reporting quality. On the other hand, another driver of reporting quality is the precision of the accounting system. A more informative accounting system reduces the manager's incentives to manipulate and increases investment e¢ -ciency, leading to a negative association between manipulation and reporting quality.
Prior studies develop settings where conservatism reduces incentives for manipulation, consistent with the arguments in Watts (2003a) . In Chen et al. (2007) , conservatism lowers manipulation incentives by reducing the di¤erence in share prices after favorable and unfavorable accounting reports. In Gao (2013) , conservatism reduces the incentives for manipulation by increasing the scrutiny applied to favorable reports. In contrast to these studies, Göx and Wagenhofer (2009) predict that the ability to manipulate reports leads to more conservative accounting, in the sense of stricter thresholds for impairment. Our study di¤ers from these by showing a setting where conservative accounting leads to more manipulation, and the manager's ability to manipulate renders the optimal accounting system less conservative. In a concurrent study, Bertomeu et al. (2013) show that conservative accounting can increase incentives for manipulation in a setting in which the manager's compensation depends on accounting reports. There, the board designs an accounting system to induce productive e¤ort at the lowest possible compensation cost. Bertomeu et al.'s (2013) results show that contracts can create, rather than eliminate, forces such that conservative accounting leads to manipulation. In contrast, we abstract from optimal contracting, and consider the usefulness of accounting reports for project selection decisions in an environment where the board and the manager have con ‡icting investment interests and the manager manipulates the report to distort the decision.
Gao and Wagenhofer (2012) also o¤er a novel explanation for the positive link between governance and conservatism. In their model, the board's task is to replace untalented executives. The board can base its decision on either an accounting report (which imprecisely signals talent), or a perfect signal obtained from a costly monitoring action. If the board has a low monitoring cost, which represents high governance quality, it optimally chooses a conservative accounting system. The conservative accounting system maximizes the information content of the good report, and the board only monitors after a bad report. If the board has a high monitoring cost, it chooses an aggressive accounting system that maximizes the information content of a bad report. With aggressive accounting, the board …res the manager after a bad report and does not require a corroborating signal from monitoring. We also predict a positive relation between governance and conservatism, but for di¤erent reasons. In addition, our model sheds light on the impact of reporting oversight and managerial optimism on the optimal choice of conservatism, accounting manipulation, reporting quality, con ‡ict between managers and shareholders, and there is no earnings manipulation (e.g., Gigler et al. 2009; Caskey and Hughes 2012; Li 2013 
Model
In our setting, a risk-neutral manager runs a …rm owned by risk-neutral shareholders who are represented by a benevolent board. The model has times 0, 1, and 2. At Time 0, the board determines the …rm's accounting policies. At Time 1, the manager provides a report to the board, who decides whether to expand the …rm's operations.
The report can be viewed as re ‡ecting the Time 1 results of the …rm's operations.
Project:
The payo¤ from expansion depends on the state of the world, which is either good or bad, 2 f g ; b g. In the good (bad) state, the expansion succeeds (fails) with certainty. If successful, the project generates incremental cash ‡ows of X > 0; and it generates zero incremental cash ‡ows if it fails. To implement the expansion, shareholders must invest I > 0, where X > I: We normalize the status quo cash ‡ows, from not expanding the …rm, to zero.
The a prior probability of the good state is < 1. In the absence of additional information, the project has a negative net present value, X I < 0. In other words, the board will not make a 'blind'approval of expansion, but instead requires information indicating the pro…tability of doing so. In the context of an accounting report, this can be viewed as representing a low-growth industry where only unexpectedly high earnings would indicate pro…table growth opportunities. In a capital budgeting context, this could re ‡ect risky industries, such as pharmaceuticals, where the typical project is likely to fail and it only pays to pursue projects after receiving some preliminary news of their pro…tability. Grinstein and Tolkowsky (2004) provide evidence that …rms in both of these types of industries are more likely to have board committees dedicated to overseeing investment decisions. The assumption of a negative ex ante NPV plays two roles: First, it creates a natural demand for conservative accounting, as we show in Section 3 and, second, it introduces a con ‡ict of interest between the shareholders and the manager as will become clear later.
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Accounting system: The …rm's information system produces an accounting signal, S 2 fS g ; S b g ; that is informative about the state :
The parameter c 2 (0; 1) captures the level of conservatism -the higher c, the more likely it is that the signal is bad. The parameter p 2 (0; 1) captures the precision of the accounting system -the higher p, the more informative is the signal. 7 The 6 This is related to Gigler et al. (2009) , who analyze conservative accounting in a setting with debt contracts and an interim abandonment decision. They predict that conservative accounting has value only when the ex ante belief is that the project should be abandoned at the interim stage. Also see a similar prediction in Lu and Sapra (2009) , where clients prefer conservative auditors when they have relatively poor ex ante payo¤s from investment. 7 Several papers use an equivalent notation where P(S g j g ) = + and P(S g j b ) = (e.g., Venugopalan 2004; Li 2013; Bertomeu et al. 2013) . Our notation can be equivalently stated using P(S g j g ) = p + (1 p)(1 c) and P(S g j b ) = (1 p)(1 c) so that our parameter p is equivalent to , and = (1 p)(1 c). Just as the 'aggressiveness' parameter cannot exceed 1 , the most aggressive accounting (c = 0) in our notation cannot exceed 1 p. We use our notation for updated beliefs conditional on the accounting signal S are:
The accounting system has several intuitive characteristics. First, when the precision p increases, both good and bad signals become more informative about the state, d P( g jSg) dp
In the extreme, when the accounting system is perfectly informative, p = 1, conservatism no longer matters and P( g jS g ; p = 1) = 1
and P( b jS b ; p = 1) = 1. Conversely, when the system is fully uninformative, p = 0, the posterior probabilities equal the a priori probabilities, P( g jS g ; p = 0) = and
Second, when the level of conservatism increases, the good signal becomes more informative about the state whereas the bad signal becomes less informative,
In the extreme, when the level of conservatism is maximized (c = 1), the good signal is perfectly informative: P( g jS g ; c = 1) = 1 and P( b jS b ; c = 1) = 1 1 p . Conversely, when the level of conservatism is minimized (c = 0), the bad signal is perfectly informative: P( g jS g ; c = 0) = 1 (1 )p and P( b jS b ; c = 0) = 1.
Manipulation: In the absence of manipulation, the publicly observed accounting report R 2 fR g ; R b g is identical to the signal S and R i = S i for i 2 fg; bg: However, the manager can engage in costly manipulative activities, denoted m 2 [0; 1], so that the …rm issues a good report with probability m even when the true signal is bad.
As we show later, the manager never wishes to increase the probability of a bad the convenience of having the parameter c re ‡ect increases in conservatism, and allowing it to vary between zero and 1.
report. The resulting probability of producing a good report given a good signal is P(R g jS g ) = 1 while the probability of producing a good report given a bad signal is P(R g jS b ) = m. The conditional probability of observing a good report when the state is good or bad, respectively, is:
Interfering with the accounting system costs the manager 1 2 km 2 , with k 0.
The manager incurs the cost of manipulation activities to bias the accounting system prior to observing the realization of the signal S. 8 For example, the manager creates vulnerabilities in the accounting system that render it possible to misrepresent bad signals, as in Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003), and the manager may face sanctions for failing to maintain adequate internal controls (PCAOB 2007, esp. "controls over management override").
We interpret the marginal manipulation cost (k) as an indicator of the quality of board oversight over the reporting process. Greater oversight (higher k) discourages manipulation by increasing the likelihood that the board, the auditor, or regulators will discover and penalize the manager for de…ciencies in the …nancial reporting system.
Expansion decision: After the board observes the report, it decides whether to expand operations. The board acts in the best interests of the shareholders and approves expansion only when it perceives expansion to be a positive NPV investment.
Because the manager does not take any actions to manipulate the report downwards, a bad report indicates that the signal is bad (P( g jR b ) = P( g jS b )
). Given that P( g jR b )X I X I < 0, the board …nds it optimal to reject expansion when
If the report is favorable, the board understands that it might have been distorted.
Nevertheless, to ensure that the report is useful for decision making, we assume that it is optimal to implement the project in this case. Speci…cally, we assume that:
where:
and later verify the conditions under which assumption (5) holds. Note that P( g jR g )
is declining in m, and exceeds P( g ) = for any m < 1. For the extreme in which m = 1 we have P( g jR g ) = and P( g jR g )X I < 0: This is intuitive because the report has no information content when m = 1. Thus, to ensure that assumption (5) is satis…ed, we assume that the parameters are such that m is not too large.
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Preferences: We assume that the manager enjoys private bene…ts of control or reputation bene…ts that are proportional to the cash payo¤ x from expansion, as in Stein (1997) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) . The manager's utility function takes the form:
9 Appendix A gives the speci…c parameter regions that satisfy (5).
where x represents the payo¤ from expansion and 1 2 km 2 is the cost of altering the accounting system. It is convenient to de…ne B X; where X is the outcome in case of success. Thus, the manager enjoys B in the event of successful expansion and zero,
otherwise. This preference function has two implications. First, the manager does not internalize the cost I, and therefore is eager to expand unless he is certain that expansion will fail (x = 0). Second, this inclination is stronger when the manager expects a higher probability of success.
We obtain a similar preference function when the manager is holding stock options. 10 To see this, let A denote the …rm's initial assets in place, the number of options the manager is holding, E the exercise price of the options, and assume, without loss of generality, that the total number of issued shares of stock is one. When the exercise price equals the …rm's no-expansion value, E = A; the value of the manager's options is (A + X I E) = (X I) in case of a successful expansion and zero otherwise. In this case, we would interpret B as (X I).
A key feature of our setting is that the manager and the board have di¤erent preferences regarding expansion, which creates an incentive for the manager to manipulate the report. The board could eliminate the manager's investment bias and hence incentives for manipulation by promising a bonus for a low accounting report.
For example, if the manager's expected payo¤ from successful manipulation is M;
the board can prevent manipulation by promising the manager a payment of M if and only if the report is unfavorable. Of course, such a contract is not only costly but would also dilute e¤ort incentives in a richer setting where the manager chooses 10 See Bertomeu et al. (2013) for a setting that explicitly considers optimal contracts in a moral hazard setting that features the interaction between conservative accounting and manipulation. There, the …rm faces no investment decisions but instead constructs the accounting system and a compensation contract in order to minimize the cost of inducing the manager to exert e¤ort. productive e¤ort ex ante. We abstract from these considerations to focus on the incentive e¤ects associated with changes in accounting conservatism and to keep the model tractable.
External …nancing: Although we package our model in terms of the board overseeing the …rm's investment decisions, we could also interpret the model as a capital market setting where the …rm must raise capital I > 0 from outside investors to implement the project. Based on the public report R, outside investors update their beliefs about the value of the project, decide whether to …nance the project and, if so, determine the payback amount D. If the report is unfavorable, investors are not willing to …nance the project. If the report is favorable, investors provide capital I and require a payback amount, D; that satis…es the following equation if investors are perfectly competitive: given by:
where the second expression follows from (8) and is identical to the objective we utilize in our main analysis.
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3 Demand for conservatism
In this section, we develop a benchmark case to study the e¤ects of changes in the accounting system with an exogenously …xed level of manipulation m. Ex ante shareholder value is:
where P( g jR g ) is given in (6). It is useful to rearrange expression (10) to obtain:
where
The shareholders'preference function (11) can be explained in an intuitive way.
The …rst term, (X I) ; is the expected cash ‡ow in an ideal world where the board directly observes the state. The term in parentheses is the expected cost of Type I
and Type II decision errors. With probability P(R g ; b ), a Type I error arises such that the accounting system generates a good report that leads to expansion in the bad state. With probability P(R b ; g ), a Type II error arises with the accounting system generating a bad report that leads to rejection in the good state.
When the precision p of the accounting system increases, both the Type I and the Type II errors decline and shareholder value increases:
When the level of conservatism c increases, the information content of the report-ing system changes such that the board is better able to block expansion when the state is bad. This comes at the cost of forgoing some investments when the state is good. That is, the probability of a Type I error declines but the probability of a Type II error increases. For a negative ex ante NPV, (I X > 0), the advantage of avoiding Type I errors dominates the cost of Type II errors and an increase in c increases shareholder value. Intuitively, the shareholders'desire to make conservative investment decisions creates a demand for conservative accounting rules. Formally:
The positive e¤ect of an increase in conservatism on shareholder value gets weaker as the level of manipulation m increases because the characteristics of the accounting system only matter if the manager's manipulation attempt fails. In addition, conservatism plays a weaker role when the accounting system has a higher precision p. In the extreme cases in which m = 1 or p = 1; conservatism has no e¤ect on reporting and hence investment e¢ ciency. Nevertheless, as long as manipulation is …xed and m < 1 and p < 1, it is strictly optimal to choose the maximum level of conservatism (c = 1).
Lemma 1
For a …xed level of manipulation, shareholder value is maximized if c = 1.
The result that conservative accounting rules facilitate decision making is driven by our assumption that expansion is not desirable when there is no additional information. Intuitively, a negative ex ante NPV implies that the expected costs of Type I errors exceeds the expected cost of Type II errors. The board therefore wishes to make conservative expansion decisions in the sense that it prefers to forgo some valuable investments as long as it can avoid pursuing failing investments. These pref-erences create a natural demand for conservative accounting rules. However, as we show in the next section, the board's desire to act conservatively introduces a con ‡ict of interest between the board and the manager. The manager is not concerned about potential overinvestment (Type I errors), but about potential underinvestment (Type II errors) and hence wishes to act aggressively. This con ‡ict of interest can cause the manager to manipulate the system, and implies that it is typically optimal to set c < 1 (as we discuss in Section 5).
However, it is useful to note here that if the ex ante NPV of the project is positive, the board wishes to make aggressive expansion decisions and therefore prefers aggressive accounting rules, c = 0. In this case, there is no con ‡ict of interest between the two parties, and the board does not need to fear manipulation. Consequently, in such a scenario, the optimal solution is trivially characterized by c = 0 and m = 0:
Manager behavior
We now turn to the manager's manipulation strategy. The manager chooses the level of manipulation to maximize his expected payo¤:
with P(
The …rst term in the second expression of (14) is the manager's expected bene…t when the state is observable and the board makes the optimal expansion decision.
In this case, there is no con ‡ict between the manager and the board -both players prefer expansion only when the state is good. The second term is the expected cost of a Type II error for the manager -the lost bene…t when the board blocks expansion after observing a bad report when, in fact, the state is good. A Type II error arises with probability P(R b ; g ) = (1 m) (1 p) c and is less likely when the level of manipulation is higher. In contrast to shareholders, the manager is not concerned about potential overinvestment (Type I errors) because he does not internalize the cost of the investment outlay. The manager's disregard for Type I errors creates a con ‡ict of interest between the manger and the board, and hence induces him to manipulate the system. The manager's choice of m satis…es:
The following comparative statics results follow immediately from (15):
Lemma 2 The manager's choice of manipulation, m, increases if:
(i) the accounting system is more conservative (c is higher),
(ii) the accounting system is less precise (p is lower), (iii) the quality of reporting oversight is weaker (k is lower), (iv) the manager enjoys greater private bene…ts (B is larger).
When the information system becomes more conservative (c increases), the board is better able to avoid bad investments (Type I error) but at the cost of forgoing some good investments (Type II error). By virtue of allowing the board to make more prudent expansion decisions, conservatism creates an incentive for the manager to manipulate the system and distort the board's decision making. As the accounting system becomes more conservative, the potential for a Type II error increases and the manager has a stronger incentive to override the system to ensure expansion. The has an incentive to manipulate the accounting system because he does not bene…t from expansions that will surely fail.
A similar argument applies when the accounting system becomes less precise (p decreases). As precision p declines, the board is more likely to block valuable investments and the manager's expected cost of a Type II error increases. This e¤ect, in turn, makes manipulation more attractive. However, a perfectly informative system (p = 1) eliminates both Type II and Type I errors, leaving the manager with no incentive to engage in manipulation.
When the manager enjoys greater bene…ts of control, B, Type II errors become more expensive for the manager, which triggers greater manipulation to push expansion. Finally, when reporting oversight is stronger (k is larger), the manager chooses a lower level of manipulation.
Optimal accounting system
We are now ready to study the optimal design of the accounting system from the shareholders'perspective. 12 The board (acting in the best interests of the shareholders) chooses the level of conservatism c to maximize …rm value (11), while taking into consideration the e¤ects of c on manipulation incentives.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in conservatism allows the board to make more cautious expansion decisions which increases shareholder value as shown in Section 3.
However, the very fact that conservative accounting facilitates board interventions causes the manager to manipulate the accounting system to push expansion. Specifically, as conservatism increases, the manager becomes more concerned that valuable projects are rejected based on noisy reports (Type II error) and hence has a stronger incentive to manipulate the system (Lemma 2). Manipulation increases the probability of a Type I error and decreases the probability of a Type II error. Using (11), we can show that the net e¤ect of an increase in m on shareholder value is negative:
When the board designs the accounting system, it has to balance the positive direct e¤ect of conservatism on shareholder value with the negative e¤ect of conservatism via its impact on the manager's manipulation incentive. Assuming an interior solution, after substituting from (15) for m; the optimal level of c can be stated as:
From (17), we see that the board chooses conservative accounting (c > 0) when the manager faces su¢ ciently high reporting oversight k relative to private bene…ts 
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 1 There is an interior solution, c 2 (0; 1), if and only if :
In an interior solution, the optimal level of conservatism is:
with manipulation:
Appendix A gives the parameter regions for which the assumptions (5) and (18) hold. Essentially, the assumptions exclude extreme divergence between the manager's and board's preferences to expand. In such cases, the board requires convincing evidence in order to agree to expand (large ex ante loss I X), but the manager's incentive to manipulate is so high (low k=( B)) that he is unable to provide convincing evidence.
Comparative statics
In this section, we study how changes in the parameters of the model a¤ect the optimal design of the accounting system, the equilibrium level of manipulation, and the …rm's reporting quality and investment e¢ ciency. To do so, it is useful to rewrite the board's …rst order condition for an optimal choice of c as:
The …rst term in (21) represents the bene…cial direct e¤ect of conservatism on …rm value and the second term re ‡ects the indirect e¤ect of conservatism via its impact on accounting manipulation. The equilibrium c equates these two forces.
Reporting oversight. The following proposition highlights the links between the board's oversight over …nancial reporting and the optimal level of conservatism, the magnitude of manipulation, and the investment e¢ ciency.
Proposition 2 As the strength of reporting oversight, k, increases: (i) the optimal level of conservatism, c, increases, (ii) the level of manipulation, m, increases, (iii) reporting quality and investment e¢ ciency, U s , increase.
Ceteris paribus, stronger oversight over …nancial reporting (higher k); reduces the manager's temptation to manipulate the accounting system. The manager's restricted ability to manipulate directly increases the bene…cial e¤ects of conservative accounting on investment e¢ ciency ( The impact of board oversight in our model is the opposite of that in Gao (2013) , where accounting becomes more conservative when earnings are easier to manipulate. Whereas conservatism counteracts accounting manipulation in Gao (2013) and Chen et al. (2007) , conservatism induces manipulation in our setting because the manager wishes to prevent the board from blocking potentially valuable investment opportunities.
Result (ii) indicates that the equilibrium level of manipulation increases with better board oversight. Although oversight directly mitigates manipulation incentives, the board optimally reacts to this change by choosing more conservative accounting, which, in turn, increases the manager's desire to manipulate. The indirect e¤ect via conservatism dominates the direct e¤ect, yielding a positive relation between reporting oversight and manipulation. For the sake of providing some intuition, consider the extreme in which the manager can costlessly manipulate the accounting system (k = 0). In this situation, one might expect that the manager chooses the highest level of manipulation m = 1. However, the board optimally responds to the manipulation concern by choosing an aggressive accounting system with c = 1; leaving the manager with no reason to manipulate (m = 0).
Result (iii) follows from applying the envelope theorem to the board's objective function. Keeping c constant, an increase in reporting oversight, k, directly curbs manipulation, and hence increases the quality of the report, the investment e¢ ciency, and shareholder value U s . The board responds to the change in k by increasing the level of accounting conservatism, which ultimately leads to more manipulation. But, by the envelope theorem, this indirect e¤ect on U s via c can be ignored and the shareholders'payo¤ is increasing in k.
Agency con ‡ict. The manager's ability to reap private bene…ts of control B from successful expansion creates an agency con ‡ict between the manager and the board. Ceteris paribus, as private bene…ts increase, the manager is more eager to manipulate the accounting system to push investment. As a consequence, it can be shown that an increase in B has e¤ects that are identical to the e¤ects of a reduction in oversight quality k.
Value of growth opportunities. In order to analyze how the reporting system changes with the value of growth opportunities, the next proposition illustrates the e¤ects of increasing the expansion cost I, while holding the gross payo¤s from expansion constant. Precision. The following proposition highlights the e¤ects of the underlying precision of the accounting system on both the accounting choices and …rm value. (ii) the level of manipulation, m, decreases, (iii) reporting quality and investment e¢ ciency, U s , increase.
An increase in the precision p a¤ects the bene…ts and the costs of conservative accounting. The two e¤ects work in opposite directions implying that the link between p and c is ambiguous. First, when the reporting system becomes more precise, conservatism plays a less important role and hence has a weaker positive a¤ect on investment e¢ ciency, that is, ), the e¤ect on manipulation dominates so that conservatism is increasing in precision.
Although an increase in precision sometimes increases conservatism, which strengthens manipulation incentives, a more informative system always leads to weaker manipulation incentives. In the extreme, when p = 1; the preferences of the manager and the board are aligned and the manager has no longer any reason to manipulate.
The precision p of the accounting system improves investment e¢ ciency in two ways. First, holding conservatism c and manipulation m …xed, a more precise ac- 13 If the baseline accounting system is insu¢ ciently informative (p < p 2 1 0:41), then c is always decreasing in p. In other words, when p < p 2 1, there are no values of the parameters (I; X; ; B; k) such that c 2 (0; 1), assumption (5) counting system reduces both Type I and Type II errors. Second, keeping c …xed, we know that manipulation m is decreasing in p; further reducing Type I errors. By the envelope theorem, we can ignore the e¤ect of p on c when assessing the impact on the optimized U s .
Managerial optimism
A large body of empirical and survey evidence supports the notion that individuals, and especially executives and entrepreneurs, can have overly optimistic beliefs about the chances that their investment ideas will succeed (Larwood and Whittaker 1977; Cooper et al. 1988; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Landier and Thesmar 2009; Ben-David et al. 2010; Graham et al. 2013 ).
14 To capture managerial optimism, we consider a setting in which shareholders and the manager disagree on the a priori probability of the good state. Speci…cally, let m and s denote the manager's and the shareholders'
prior subjective beliefs about the probability of the good state, respectively, with s m < 1. The players'beliefs ( s ; m ) are common knowledge. The next proposition shows how managerial optimism a¤ects the optimal design of the accounting system, the extent of manipulation, and investment e¢ ciency.
Proposition 5 When the manager is more optimistic about future success ( m is larger):
(i) the …rm chooses a lower level of conservatism, c,
(ii) the manager engages in less manipulation, m; and (iii) reporting quality and investment e¢ ciency, U s ; decrease.
Optimistic managers have a stronger prior belief that expansion will succeed and hence are more concerned about the risk of a Type II error -i.e., that valuable investment opportunities are mistakenly rejected. Ceteris paribus, optimistic managers are therefore more eager to manipulate the system to push expansion. The board responds to the increased manipulation temptation by lowering the level of conservatism, which, in turn, weakens manipulation incentives. This indirect e¤ect on manipulation via conservatism dominates the direct e¤ect, resulting in a negative relation between managerial optimism and manipulation. Despite the fact that manipulation declines, optimism reduces reporting quality and investment e¢ ciency.
Note that managerial optimism yields similar results to our main analysis even when the manager does not enjoy empire bene…ts but wishes to maximize shareholder value. When the manager's prior belief about the probability of success, m ; is su¢ ciently high, his perceived NPV of unconditional expansion is positive ( m X > I > s X): In this case, and in contrast to shareholders, the manager is more concerned about the cost of forgoing valuable investments (Type II error) than about the cost of making bad investments (Type I error). The manager's optimal level of manipulation is then given by:
which is positive if m and c are su¢ ciently high. As before, when the level of conservatism declines, the potential for a Type II error declines, and the manager has less incentives to manipulate. Eventually, when c hits c = p(1
, the manager no longer manipulates, m = 0:
Empirical predictions and discussion
Our analysis of the board's choice of conservatism in Proposition 1 pertains to the baseline accounting system. However, empiricists observe only the outputs of the accounting system, which also re ‡ect manipulation. Manipulation drives a wedge between the board's accounting choices and the conservatism re ‡ected in the …nancial statements. In our setting, the probability P(R b j g ) of a bad report in the good state is the e¤ective level of conservative accounting.
Expression (4) gives P(R g j g ), from which we can compute P(R b j g ) = (1
Were it not for the 1 m term, the probability P(R b j g ) of a bad report in the good state provides a clear proxy for the board's choice of c. However, manipulation m increases with conservatism c, so that an increase in m will partially o¤set the direct e¤ect of an increase in c on P(R b j g ). The e¤ect on c dominates so that observed conservatism P(R b j g ) increases in I and k, and decreases in B and m (in case of managerial optimism), consistent with the e¤ects on c as given in Propositions 2 through 4. Also, while the e¤ect of precision p on c varies with the model's parameters, P(R b j g ) always decreases in p because of the presence of a direct e¤ect of precision (the 1 p term).
The e¤ect of I on observed conservatism P(R b j g ) implies that …rms with few profitable growth opportunities will have relatively more conservative accounting. Consistent with this result, Grinstein and Tolkowsky (2004) …nd that …rms with committees that review non-M&A investments tend to have low market-to-book ratios, consistent with lower growth opportunities. They also …nd that …rms with M&A-related board committees tend to have high research and development, consistent with …rms in environments with high ex ante risk. This prediction di¤ers from Bagnoli and Watts (2005) , where managers may use conservative accounting to signal private information. In our setting, the prior belief regarding the value of expansion is common knowledge and there is no role for signaling.
Prior empirical studies (e.g., Watts 2003a,b; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et al. 2009 ) and analytical work (e.g., Gao 2013) have portrayed accounting conservatism as a tool that enables boards to perform their monitoring duties, particularly in regard to mitigating earnings manipulation. In our model, accounting conservatism enables boards to make more cautious investments but this feature of conservatism increases the manager's incentive to manipulate the accounting system.
Thus, boards can better exploit the advantages of conservative accounting if they have su¢ ciently strong oversight to mitigate the negative side e¤ects on manipulation. We predict that accounting becomes more aggressive as agency problems increase, which occurs because conservative accounting exacerbates the manager's incentive to manipulate reporting.
Summarizing, we have the following predictions regarding the observed level of conservatism:
Prediction 1 The observed level of conservatism P(R b j g ) is greater for:
(i) Firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities (higher I);
(ii) Firms with e¤ective reporting oversight, precise accounting systems, low private bene…ts, and low managerial optimism (high k; p and low B; m ). While we predict that …rms with stronger reporting oversight experience more accounting manipulation, this does not imply that oversight reduces investment ef…ciency and …rm value. Proposition 2 indicates that company value is increasing in the e¤ectiveness of oversight (high k). The higher manipulation in …rms with strong oversight is a by-product of their choice of more conservative accounting. The e¤ect of higher conservatism dominates the partially o¤setting impact of higher accounting manipulation so that …rms with e¤ective monitoring make more e¢ cient investments.
All of these predictions are counterintuitive but can be explained by the observation that the board optimally responds to changes in the environment that reduce 15 Signing the derivative of P s ( b ; R g ; S b ) with respect to p requires accounting for the parameter restrictions that (foster) manipulation incentives by increasing (decreasing) the level of conservatism, which, in turn, strengthens (weakens) manager's desire to distort the accounting system. In our setting, given that the only goal of the reporting system is to facilitate investment decisions, an accounting system is of better quality if it leads to better investment decisions.
The above analysis demonstrates that the presence of manipulation need not be an indicator of poor reporting quality. On the one hand, manipulation associated with a low level of precision p indicates poor reporting quality. On the other hand, manipulation can also be associated with e¤ective oversight (high k), which is also associated with conservative reporting and e¢ cient investment decisions that are indicative of high reporting quality. Our results suggest that empirical researchers should be careful when using the magnitude of manipulation in …rms as a proxy for reporting quality -it is not always true that less manipulation actually represents an environment with better …nancial reporting.
Conclusion
We develop a model to analyze the e¤ects of reporting oversight on the optimal choice of conservatism, the magnitude of accounting manipulation, reporting quality, and investment e¢ ciency. The accounting report guides the board's decision of whether to pursue a new investment opportunity such as expanding the …rm. Consistent with previous models, conservative accounting increases the veri…cation standards required for good relative to bad reports and therefore reduces (increases) the information content of bad (good) reports. Ceteris paribus, conservatism is valuable because directors (and shareholders) wish to make conservative expansion decisions -that is, directors are more concerned about the risk of investing in bad projects (Type I error) than they are about the risk of foregoing good investments (Type II error).
In contrast to the board, the manager prefers expansion as long as there is a chance of success and hence is eager to avoid Type II errors. This preference can arise, for example, because the manager enjoys private bene…ts of control from expansion or is holding stock options. The very fact that conservatism allows the board to more aggressively intervene in the …rm's investment strategy encourages the manager to distort the accounting system. As conservatism increases, the risk of Type II errors increases and the manager has a stronger inclination to manipulate the system to push expansion.
This e¤ect of conservatism on manipulation explains our second main result: …rms with stronger oversight over …nancial reporting choose more conservative accounting.
The optimality of conservative accounting depends on boards being able to e¤ectively monitor reporting to mitigate the negative side e¤ects of conservatism. Firms with weak reporting oversight cannot directly curb manipulation, and therefore choose aggressive accounting systems in order to reduce managers'manipulation incentives.
Paradoxically, we predict that an improvement in oversight is associated with more, rather than less, accounting manipulation. This follows because stronger boards not only directly deter manipulation, but also choose more conservative accounting systems. A higher level of conservatism, in turn, encourages manipulation, and this latter e¤ect dominates the former. Although oversight and manipulation are positively related, improvements in oversight unambiguously lead to higher reporting quality and more e¢ cient investment decisions.
We also generate predictions relating managerial optimism to the optimal level of conservatism, accounting manipulation, quality of reporting, and investment ef-…ciency. Essentially, when the manager is more optimistic about the probability of successful expansion, he has a stronger direct incentive to manipulate the accounting report, which causes the board to choose less conservative accounting. The reduction in conservatism lowers incentives for manipulation, such that in equilibrium, …rms with more optimistic managers exhibit a smaller level of manipulation. Nevertheless, managerial optimism always leads to lower reporting quality and less e¢ cient investments.
A Proofs and derivations
A.1 Derivation of equilibrium (Lemma 2 and Proposition 1)
For the purposes of deriving the equilibrium, we allow for the possibility that the manager and shareholders have di¤erent prior beliefs about the probability of success. We denote the manager's (shareholders') beliefs with an m (s) subscript, with P m ( g ) = m P s ( g ) = s . Under this structure, we have for i 2 fs; mg:
(A.1a)
The manager's expected payo¤ is:
and gives:
The shareholders'payo¤, corresponding to (11), is:
The negative ex ante NPV assumption ( s X < I) implies that the second-order condition is satis…ed when choosing c to maximize (A.4) and solving the …rst-order condition gives:
which lies in (0; 1) if (18) This completes the proof of Proposition 1. We now derive the parameter restrictions that guarantee an interior level of conservatism and satisfy the positive ex post NPV assumption (5). We …rst state the parameter restrictions.
, where z 2 (1; 1=p) and p 2 (0; 1). If , then the quadratic is always positive so that the NPV condition 16 The assumptions s X < I and X > I imply that the lower bound on the left-hand-side of the interval is less than the upper bound on the right-hand-side.
does not place a binding constraint on the parameters. Direct computations show that p 2 (0; 1) and z > 1 imply that y < y 0 , so that there is no range of y < y with an equilibrium having interior c and positive ex post NPV. The root y + > y 0 if and only if z < 1 p . The only range where the positive NPV condition might be binding is z 2 (1; 1=p) . In order for there to be an equilibrium with some y > y + satisfying the NPV condition and also giving an interior c, it must be the case that y + < y 1 , which, for z 2 (1; 1=p), holds if and only if z 2 (z; 1=p). The bound z lies between (1; 1=p) for all p 2 (0; 1).
Alternative objective for setting c
Here, we derive results in a setting where a regulator determines c to maximize social welfare. Given a weight that measures the importance of the manager's utility which has the following …rst-order condition: 
Proof of Proposition ??
The statements on the e¤ects of parameters follow directly from computations of the derivatives of c as given in expression (19). The parameter restrictions for dc=dp > 0 follow because 
B Alternative cost function
In this Appendix, we discuss an alternative formulation where the manager incurs the manipulation cost only when attempting to manipulate following a bad signal S b .
In this setting, the manager's objective function is:
( 1 
